NOTICE:鈥俆his opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.鈥僐eaders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 13鈥894
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PETITIONER v. ROBERT J. MacLEAN
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit
[January 21, 2015]
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law generally provides whistleblower protections to an employee who discloses information revealing 鈥渁ny violation of any law, rule, or regulation,鈥 or 鈥渁 substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.鈥5 U. S. C. 搂2302(b)(8)(A). An exception exists, however, for disclosures that are 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law.鈥 Ibid. Here, a federal air marshal publicly disclosed that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had de-cided to cut costs by removing air marshals from certain long-distance flights. The question presented is whether that disclosure was 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law.鈥
I
A
In 2002, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act,116Stat.2135. As relevant here, that Act provides that the TSA 鈥渟hall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out security . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.鈥49 U. S. C. 搂114(r)(1)(C).
Around the same time, the TSA promulgated regulations prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of what it called 鈥渟ensitive security information.鈥 See 67 Fed. Reg. 8351 (2002). The regulations described 18 categories of sensitive security information, including 鈥淸s]pecific details of aviation security measures . . . [such as] information concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or missions, and the methods involved in such operations.鈥 49 CFR 搂1520.7(j) (2002). Sensitive security information is not classified, so the TSA can share it with individuals who do not have a security clearance, such as airport employees. Compare Exec. Order 13526, 搂4.1, 3 CFR 298, 314鈥315 (2009 Comp.), with 49 CFR 搂1520.11(c) (2013).
B
Robert J. MacLean became a federal air marshal for the TSA in 2001. In that role, MacLean was assigned to protect passenger flights from potential hijackings. See49 U. S. C. 搂44917(a).
On July 26, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a confidential advisory about a potential hijacking plot. The advisory said that members of the terrorist group al Qaeda were planning to attack passenger flights, and that they 鈥渃onsidered suicide hijackings and bombings as the most promising methods to destroy aircraft in flight, as well as to strike ground targets.鈥 App. 16. The advisory identified a number of potential targets, including the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, and the east coast of the United States. Finally, the advisory warned that at least one of the attacks 鈥渃ould be executed by the end of the summer 2003.鈥 Ibid.
The TSA soon summoned all air marshals (including MacLean) for face-to-face briefings about the hijacking plot. During MacLean鈥檚 briefing, a TSA official told him that the hijackers were planning to 鈥渟muggle weapons in camera equipment or children鈥檚 toys through foreign security,鈥 and then 鈥渇ly into the United States . . . into an airport that didn鈥檛 require them to be screened.鈥 Id., at 92. The hijackers would then board U. S. flights, 鈥渙verpower the crew or the Air Marshals and . . . fly the planes into East Coast targets.鈥 Id., at 93.
A few days after the briefing, MacLean received from the TSA a text message cancelling all overnight missions from Las Vegas until early August. MacLean, who was stationed in Las Vegas, believed that cancelling those missions during a hijacking alert was dangerous. He also believed that the cancellations were illegal, given that federal law required the TSA to put an air marshal on every flight that 鈥減resent[s] high security risks,鈥49 U. S. C. 搂44917(a)(2), and provided that 鈥渘onstop, long distance flights, such as those targeted on September 11, 2001, should be a priority,鈥 搂44917(b). See App. 95, 99, 101.
MacLean therefore asked a supervisor why the TSA had canceled the missions. The supervisor responded that the TSA wanted 鈥渢o save money on hotel costs because there was no more money in the budget.鈥 Id., at 95. MacLean also called the DHS Inspector General鈥檚 Office to report the cancellations. But a special agent in that office told him there was 鈥渘othing that could be done.鈥 Id., at 97.
Unwilling to accept those responses, MacLean contacted an MSNBC reporter and told him about the canceled missions. In turn, the reporter published a story about the TSA鈥檚 decision, titled 鈥淎ir Marshals pulled from key flights.鈥 Id., at 36. The story reported that air marshals would 鈥渘o longer be covering cross-country or international flights鈥 because the agency did not want them 鈥渢o incur the expense of staying overnight in hotels.鈥 Ibid. The story also reported that the cancellations were 鈥減articularly disturbing to some鈥 because they 鈥渃oincide[d] with anew high-level hijacking threat issued by the Department of Homeland Security.鈥 Id., at 37.
After MSNBC published the story, several Members of Congress criticized the cancellations. Within 24 hours, the TSA reversed its decision and put air marshals back on the flights. Id., at 50.
At first, the TSA did not know that MacLean was the source of the disclosure. In September 2004, however, MacLean appeared on NBC Nightly News to criticize the TSA鈥檚 dress code for air marshals, which he believed made them too easy to identify. Although MacLean appeared in disguise, several co-workers recognized his voice, and the TSA began investigating the appearance. During that investigation, MacLean admitted that he had disclosed the text message back in 2003. Consequently, in April 2006, the TSA fired MacLean for disclosing sensitive security information without authorization.
MacLean challenged his firing before the Merit Systems Protection Board, arguing in relevant part that his disclosure was protected whistleblowing activity under5 U. S. C. 搂2302(b)(8)(A). The Board held that MacLean did not qualify for protection under that statute, however, because his disclosure was 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law.鈥 116 MSPR 562, 569鈥572 (2011).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board鈥檚 decision. 714 F. 3d 1301 (2013). The parties had agreed that, in order for MacLean鈥檚 disclosure to be 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law,鈥 it must have been 鈥減rohibited by a statute rather than by a regulation.鈥 Id., at 1308 (emphasis added). Thus, the issue before the court was whether the statute authorizing the TSA鈥檚 regulations鈥攏ow codified at49 U. S. C. 搂114(r)(1)鈥斺渟pecifically prohibited鈥 MacLean鈥檚 disclosure. 714 F. 3d, at 1308.[1]*
The court first held that Section 114(r)(1) was not a prohibition. The statute did 鈥渘ot expressly prohibit employee disclosures,鈥 the court explained, but instead empowered the TSA to 鈥減rescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure[s]鈥 if the TSA decided that disclosing the information would harm public safety. Id., at 1309. The court therefore concluded that MacLean鈥檚 disclosure was prohibited by a regulation, which the parties had agreed could not be a 鈥渓aw鈥 under Section 2302(b)(8)(A). Ibid.
The court then held that, even if Section 114(r)(1) were a prohibition, it was not 鈥渟ufficiently specific.鈥 Ibid. The court explained that a law is sufficiently specific only if it 鈥渞equires that matters be withheld from the public as to leave no discretion on the issue, or . . . establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.鈥 Ibid. (quoting S. Rep. No. 95鈥969 (1978)). And Section 114(r)(1) did not meet that test because it 鈥減rovide[d] only general criteria for withholding information and [gave] some discretion to the [TSA] to fashion regulations for prohibiting disclosure.鈥 714 F. 3d, at 1309. The court accordingly vacated the Board鈥檚 decision and remanded for a determination of whether MacLean鈥檚 disclosure met the other requirements under Section 2302(b)(8)(A). Id., at 1310鈥1311.
We granted certiorari. 572 U. S. ___ (2014).
II
Section 2302(b)(8) provides, in relevant part, that a federal agency may not take
鈥渁 personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of
鈥(A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences
鈥(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
鈥(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety,
鈥渋f such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.鈥
The Government argues that this whistleblower statute does not protect MacLean because his disclosure regarding the canceled missions was 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law鈥 in two ways. First, the Government argues that the disclosure was specifically prohibited by the TSA鈥檚 regulations on sensitive security information: 49 CFR 搂搂1520.5(a)鈥(b), 1520.7(j) (2003). Second, the Government argues that the disclosure was specifically prohibited by49 U. S. C. 搂114(r)(1), which authorized the TSA to pro-mulgate those regulations. We address each argument in turn.
A
1
In 2003, the TSA鈥檚 regulations prohibited the disclosure of 鈥淸s]pecific details of aviation security measures . . . [such as] information concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or missions, and the methods involved in such operations.鈥 49 CFR 搂1520.7(j). MacLean does not dispute before this Court that the TSA鈥檚 regulations prohibited his disclosure regarding the canceled missions. Thus, the question here is whether a disclosure that is specifically prohibited by regulation is also 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law鈥 under Section 2302(b)(8)(A). (Emphasis added.)
The answer is no. Throughout Section 2302, Congress repeatedly used the phrase 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation.鈥 For example, Section 2302(b)(1)(E) prohibits a federal agency from discriminating against an employee 鈥渙n the basis of marital status or political affiliation, as prohibited under any law, rule, or regulation.鈥 For another example, Section 2302(b)(6) prohibits an agency from 鈥済rant[ing] any preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation.鈥 And for a third example, Section 2302(b)(9)(A) prohibits an agency from retaliating against an employee for 鈥渢he exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation.鈥
In contrast, Congress did not use the phrase 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation鈥 in the statutory language at issue here; it used the word 鈥渓aw鈥 standing alone. That is significant because Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another. Russello v. United States,464 U. S. 16,23 (1983). Thus, Congress鈥檚 choice to say 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law鈥 rather than 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation鈥 suggests that Congress meant to exclude rules and regulations.
The interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally when it omits language included elsewhere applies with particular force here for two reasons. First, Congress used 鈥渓aw鈥 and 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation鈥 in close proximity鈥攊ndeed, in the same sentence. 搂2302(b)(8)(A) (protecting the disclosure of 鈥渁ny violation of any law, rule, or regulation . . . if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law鈥). Second, Congress used the broader phrase 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation鈥 repeatedly鈥攏ine times in Section 2302 alone. See 搂搂2302(a)(2)(D)(i), (b)(1)(E), (b)(6), (b)(8)(A)(i), (b)(8)(B)(i), (b)(9)(A), (b)(12), (b)(13), (d)(5). Those two aspects of the whistleblower statute make Con-gress鈥檚 choice to use the narrower word 鈥渓aw鈥 seem quite deliberate.
We drew the same inference in Department of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA,494 U. S. 922 (1990). There, the Government argued that the word 鈥渓aws鈥 in one section of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 meant the same thing as the phrase 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation鈥 in another section of the Act. Id., at 931. We rejected that argument as 鈥渟im-ply contrary to any reasonable interpretation of the text.鈥 Id., at 932. Indeed, we held that a statute that referred to 鈥渓aws鈥 in one section and 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation鈥 in another 鈥渃annot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean the same thing in both places.鈥 Ibid. That inference is even more compelling here, because the statute refers to 鈥渓aw鈥 and 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation鈥 in the same sentence, rather than several sections apart.
Another part of the statutory text points the same way. After creating an exception for disclosures 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law,鈥 Section 2302(b)(8)(A) goes on to create a second exception for information 鈥渟pecifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.鈥 This exception is limited to action taken directly by the President. That suggests that the word 鈥渓aw鈥 in the only other exception is limited to actions by Congress鈥攁fter all, it would be unusual for the first exception to include action taken by executive agencies, when the second exception requires action by the President himself.
In addition, a broad interpretation of the word 鈥渓aw鈥 could defeat the purpose of the whistleblower statute. If 鈥渓aw鈥 included agency rules and regulations, then an agency could insulate itself from the scope of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) merely by promulgating a regulation that 鈥渟pecifically prohibited鈥 whistleblowing. But Congress passed the whistleblower statute precisely because it did not trust agencies to regulate whistleblowers within their ranks. Thus, it is unlikely that Congress meant to include rules and regulations within the word 鈥渓aw.鈥
2
The Government admits that some regulations fall outside the word 鈥渓aw鈥 as used in Section 2302(b)(8)(A). But, the Government says, that does not mean that all regulations are excluded. The Government suggests two interpretations that would distinguish 鈥渓aw鈥 from 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation,鈥 but would still allow the word 鈥渓aw鈥漷o subsume the TSA鈥檚 regulations on sensitive security information.
First, the Government argues that the word 鈥渓aw鈥 includes all regulations that have the 鈥渇orce and effect of law鈥 (i.e., legislative regulations), while excluding those that do not (e.g., interpretive rules). Brief for Petitioner 19鈥22. The Government bases this argument on our decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,441 U. S. 281 (1979). There, we held that legislative regulations generally fall within the meaning of the word 鈥渓aw,鈥 and that it would take a 鈥渃lear showing of contrary legislative intent鈥 before we concluded otherwise. Id., at 295鈥296. Thus, because the TSA鈥檚 regulations have the force and effect of law, the Government says that they should qualify as 鈥渓aw鈥 under the statute.
The Government鈥檚 description of Chrysler is accurate enough. But Congress鈥檚 use of the word 鈥渓aw,鈥 in close connection with the phrase 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation,鈥 provides the necessary 鈥渃lear showing鈥 that 鈥渓aw鈥 does not include regulations. Indeed, using 鈥渓aw鈥 and 鈥渓aw, rule, or regulation鈥 in the same sentence would be a very obscure way of drawing the Government鈥檚 nuanced distinction between different types of regulations. Had Congress wanted to draw that distinction, there were far easier and clearer ways to do so. For example, at the time Congress passed Section 2302(b)(8)(A), another federal statute defined the words 鈥渞egulatory order鈥 to include a 鈥渞ule or regulation, if it has the force and effect of law.鈥7 U. S. C. 搂450c(a) (1976 ed.). Likewise, another federal statute defined the words 鈥淪tate law鈥 to include 鈥渁ll laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.鈥29 U. S. C. 搂1144(c)(1) (1976 ed.). As those examples show, Congress knew how to distinguish between regulations that had the force and effect of law and those that did not, but chose not to do so in Section 2302(b)(8)(A).
Second, the Government argues that the word 鈥渓aw鈥 includes at least those regulations that were 鈥減romulgated pursuant to an express congressional directive.鈥 Brief for Petitioner 21. Outside of this case, however, the Government was unable to find a single example of the word 鈥渓aw鈥 being used in that way. Not a single dictionary definition, not a single statute, not a single case. The Government鈥檚 interpretation happens to fit this case precisely, but it needs more than that to recommend it.
Although the Government argues here that the word 鈥渓aw鈥 includes rules and regulations, it definitively re-jected that argument in the Court of Appeals. For example, the Government鈥檚 brief accepted that the word 鈥渓aw鈥漨eant 鈥渓egislative enactment,鈥 and said that the 鈥渙nly dispute鈥 was whether49 U. S. C. 搂114(r)(1) 鈥渟erve[d] as that legislative enactment.鈥 Brief for Respondent in No. 11鈥3231 (CA Fed.), pp. 46鈥47. Then, at oral argument, a judge asked the Government鈥檚 attorney the following question: 鈥淚 thought I understood your brief to concede that [the word 鈥渓aw鈥漖 can鈥檛 be a rule or regulation, it means statute. Am I wrong?鈥 The Government鈥檚 attorney responded: 鈥淵ou鈥檙e not wrong your honor. I鈥檒l be as clear as I can. 鈥楽pecifically prohibited by law鈥 here means statute.鈥 Oral Arg. Audio in No. 11鈥3231, at 22:42鈥23:03; see also id., at 29:57鈥30:03 (鈥淣ow, as we鈥檝e been discussing here, we鈥檙e not saying here that [the word 鈥渓aw鈥漖 needs to encompass regulations. We鈥檙e saying statute.鈥). Those concessions reinforce our conclusion that the Government鈥檚 proposed interpretations are unpersuasive.
In sum, when Congress used the phrase 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law鈥 instead of 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation,鈥 it meant to exclude rules and regulations. We therefore hold that the TSA鈥檚 regulations do not qualify as 鈥渓aw鈥 for purposes of Section 2302(b)(8)(A).
B
We next consider whether MacLean鈥檚 disclosure regarding the canceled missions was 鈥渟pecifically prohibited鈥 by49 U. S. C. 搂114(r)(1) itself. As relevant here, that statute provides that the TSA 鈥渟hall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out security . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.鈥 搂114(r)(1)(C).
This statute does not prohibit anything. On the con-trary, it authorizes something鈥攊t authorizes the Under Secretary to 鈥減rescribe regulations.鈥 Thus, by its terms Section 114(r)(1) did not prohibit the disclosure at issue here.
The Government responds that Section 114(r)(1) did prohibit MacLean鈥檚 disclosure by imposing a 鈥渓egislative mandate鈥 on the TSA to promulgate regulations to that effect. See Brief for Petitioner 28, 33; see also post, at 2鈥3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But the Government pushes the statute too far. Section 114(r)(1) says that the TSA shall prohibit disclosures only 鈥if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.鈥 搂114(r)(1)(C) (emphasis added). That language affords substantial discretion to the TSA in deciding whether to prohibit any particular disclosure.
The dissent tries to downplay the scope of that discretion, viewing it as the almost ministerial task of 鈥identifying whether a particular piece of information falls within the scope of Congress鈥 command.鈥 Post, at 3. But determining which documents meet the statutory standard of 鈥渄etrimental to the security of transportation鈥 requires the exercise of considerable judgment. For example, the Government says that Section 114(r)(1) requires the Under Secretary to prohibit disclosures like MacLean鈥檚. The Government also says, however, that the statute does not require the Under Secretary to prohibit an employee from disclosing that 鈥渇ederal air marshals will be absent from important flights, but declining to specify which flights.鈥 Reply Brief 23. That fine-grained distinction comes not from Section 114(r)(1) itself, but from the Under Secretary鈥檚 exercise of discretion. It is the TSA鈥檚 regulations鈥攏ot the statute鈥攖hat prohibited MacLean鈥檚 disclosure. And as the dissent agrees, a regulation does not count as 鈥渓aw鈥 under the whistleblower statute. See post, at 1.
The Government insists, however, that this grant of discretion does not make Section 114(r)(1) any less of a prohibition. In support, the Government relies on Administrator, FAA v. Robertson,422 U. S. 255 (1975). That case involved the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which requires federal agencies to disclose information upon request unless, among other things, the information is 鈥渟pecifically exempted from disclosure by statute.鈥5 U. S. C. 搂552(b)(3). In Robertson, we held that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was one such statute, because it gave the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 鈥渁 broad degree of discretion鈥 in deciding whether to disclose or withhold information. 422 U. S., at 266.
The Government tries to analogize that case to this one. In Robertson, the Government says, the FAA鈥檚 discretion whether to disclose information did not preclude a finding that the information was 鈥渟pecifically exempted鈥 from disclosure by statute. So too here, the Government says, the TSA鈥檚 discretion whether to prohibit disclosure of information does not preclude a finding that the information is 鈥渟pecifically prohibited鈥 from disclosure by Section 114(r)(1). See Brief for Petitioner 30.
This analogy fails. FOIA and Section 2302(b)(8)(A) differ in an important way: The provision of FOIA at issue involves information that is 鈥exempted鈥 from disclosure, while Section 2302(b)(8)(A) involves information that is 鈥prohibited鈥 from disclosure.
A statute that exempts information from mandatory disclosure may nonetheless give the agency discretion to release that exempt information to the public. In such a case, the agency鈥檚 exercise of discretion has no effect on whether the information is 鈥渆xempted from disclosure by statute鈥濃攊t remains exempt whatever the agency chooses to do.
The situation is different when it comes to a statute giving an agency discretion to prohibit the disclosure of information. The information is not prohibited from disclosure by statute regardless of what the agency does. Itis the agency鈥檚 exercise of discretion that determines whether there is a prohibition at all. Thus, when Section 114(r)(1) gave the TSA the discretion to prohibit the disclosure of information, the statute did not create a prohibition鈥攊t gave the TSA the power to create one. And because Section 114(r)(1) did not create a prohibition, MacLean鈥檚 disclosure was not 鈥減rohibited by law鈥 under Section 2302(b)(8)(A), but only by a regulation issued in the TSA鈥檚 discretion.
In any event, Robertson was a case about FOIA, not Section 2302, and our analysis there depended on two FOIA-specific factors that are not present here. First, we examined the legislative history of FOIA and determined that Congress did not intend that statute to affect laws like the Federal Aviation Act. 422 U. S., at 263鈥265. In particular, we noted that the Civil Aeronautics Board had expressed its view during congressional hearings that the Federal Aviation Act qualified as an exempting statute under FOIA, and that 鈥渘o question was raised or challenge made鈥 to the agency鈥檚 view. Id., at 264鈥265. But that legislative history can have no effect on our analysis of Section 2302(b)(8)(A).
Second, we said that the Federal Aviation Act could fail to qualify as an exempting statute only if we read FOIA 鈥渁s repealing by implication all existing statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records.鈥 Id., at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted). Then, relying on the presumption that 鈥渞epeals by implication are disfavored,鈥 we rejected that interpretation of FOIA. But the presumption against implied repeals has no relevance here. Saying that Section 114(r)(1) is not a prohibition under the whistleblower statute is not the same as saying that the whistleblower statute implicitly repealed Section 114(r)(1). On the contrary, Section 114(r)(1) remains in force by allowing the TSA to deny FOIA requests and prohibit employee disclosures that do not qualify for whistleblower protection under Section 2302(b)(8)(A).
Ultimately, FOIA and Section 2302(b)(8)(A) are different statutes鈥攖hey have different language, different histories, and were enacted in different contexts. Our interpretation of one, therefore, has no impact whatsoever on our interpretation of the other.
III
Finally, the Government warns that providing whistleblower protection to individuals like MacLean would 鈥済ravely endanger public safety.鈥 Brief for Petitioner 38. That protection, the Government argues, would make the confidentiality of sensitive security information depend on the idiosyncratic judgment of each of the TSA鈥檚 60,000 employees. Id., at 37. And those employees will 鈥渕ost likely lack access to all of the information that led the TSA to make particular security decisions.鈥 Id., at 38. Thus, the Government says, we should conclude that Congress did not intend for Section 2302(b)(8)(A) to cover disclosures like MacLean鈥檚.
Those concerns are legitimate. But they are concerns that must be addressed by Congress or the President, rather than by this Court. Congress could, for example, amend Section 114(r)(1) so that the TSA鈥檚 prohibitions on disclosure override the whistleblower protections in Section 2302(b)(8)(A)鈥攋ust as those prohibitions currently override FOIA. See 搂114(r)(1) (authorizing the TSA to prohibit disclosures 鈥淸n]otwithstanding section 552 of title 5鈥); see also10 U. S. C. 搂2640(h) (鈥渢he Secretary of Defense may (notwithstanding any other provision of law) withhold from public disclosure safety-related information that is provided to the Secretary voluntarily by an air carrier for the purposes of this section鈥). Congress could also exempt the TSA from the requirements of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) entirely, as Congress has already done for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office. See5 U. S. C. 搂2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I).
Likewise, the President could prohibit the disclosure of sensitive security information by Executive order. Indeed, the Government suggested at oral argument that the President could 鈥渆ntirely duplicate鈥 the regulations that the TSA has issued under Section 114(r)(1). Tr. of Oral Arg. 16鈥20. Such an action would undoubtedly create an exception to the whistleblower protections found in Section 2302(b)(8)(A).
Although Congress and the President each has the power to address the Government鈥檚 concerns, neither has done so. It is not our role to do so for them.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
Affirmed.
Notes
[1]* This statute has a complicated history. It was codified at 49 U. S. C.搂40119(b)(1) when the TSA initially promulgated its regulations on sensitive security information. It was codified at 搂114(s)(1) when MacLean disclosed the text message to MSNBC. And it is now codified at 搂114(r)(1). The Federal Circuit referred to 搂40119(b)(1) in its opinion. Because the statute has remained identical in all relevant respects, however, we and the parties refer to the current version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 13鈥894
_________________
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PETITIONER v. ROBERT J. MacLEAN
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit
[January 21, 2015]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, dissenting.
I agree with much of the Court鈥檚 opinion. I have no qualms with the Court鈥檚 conclusion that the phrase 鈥渟pecifically prohibited by law,鈥 as used in the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA),5 U. S. C. 搂2302(b)(8)(A), does not encompass disclosures prohibited only by regulation. See ante, at 7. Nor do I see any problem in the distinction the Court draws between statutes that prohibit information from being disclosed, the violation of which may preclude application of the WPA, and statutes that simply exempt information from otherwise-applicable disclosure requirements, which do not trigger the WPA鈥檚 鈥減rohibited by law鈥 exception. See ante, at 12鈥13.
I part ways with the Court, however, when it concludes that49 U. S. C. 搂114(r)(1) does not itself prohibit the type of disclosure at issue here鈥攖he release of information regarding the absence of federal air marshals on overnight flights. Ante, at 11. That statute provides, in relevant part, that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 鈥shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out security . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.鈥 搂114(r)(1) (emphasis added).
The Court reasons, first, that Section 114(r)(1) does not 鈥減rohibit anything,鈥 but instead simply 鈥authorizes鈥 the TSA to prescribe regulations. Ante, at 11. But this contention overlooks the statute鈥檚 use of the word 鈥渟hall,鈥 which, as we have observed, 鈥済enerally means 鈥榤ust.鈥 鈥 Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,515 U. S. 417,432, n.9 (1995); see also, e.g., Federal. Express Corp. v. Holowecki,552 U. S. 389,400 (2008) (鈥淐ongress鈥 use of the term 鈥榮hall鈥 indicates an intent to 鈥榠mpose discretionless obligations鈥 鈥) (some internal quotation marks omitted)); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 114 (2012) (鈥淸W]hen the word shall can reasonably read as mandatory, it ought to be so read鈥). Section 114(r)(1) does not merely authorize the TSA to promulgate regulations; it directs it to do so, and describes what those regulations must accomplish.
The Court focuses, second, on the fact that Section 114(r) authorizes the TSA to 鈥 鈥榙ecid[e]鈥 鈥 whether the disclosure of a particular item of information would in fact be 鈥 鈥榙etrimental to the security of transportation.鈥 鈥 Ante, at 11鈥12 (emphasis deleted). I certainly agree that this language vests some discretion in the agency.[1] But the agency is required to prevent the disclosure of any information it determines is within Congress鈥 prohibition; its discretion pertains only to identifying whether a particular piece of information falls within the scope of Congress鈥 command. In concluding that such residual agency discretion deprives Section 114(r) of prohibitory effect, the Court overlooks the degree of agency involvement that is necessary in the administration of many antidisclosure statutes. Congress cannot be expected to identify with particularity each individual document or datum the release of which it wants to preclude. Often, it will have to leave to an agency or other enforcing authority the tasks of defining鈥攑erhaps through regulations鈥攅xactly what type of information falls within the scope of the congressional prohibition, and of determining whether a particular item of information fits the bill. The enforcing authority may, as the Court puts it, sometimes be required to make some 鈥渇ine-grained distinction[s]鈥 in fulfilling this charge, ante, at 12, but that does not change the fact that Congress itself is the source of the prohibition on disclosure.[2]
Indeed, Congress appears to have anticipated the need for agency involvement in the interpretation and enforcement of antidisclosure statutes at the time it enacted the WPA. The Senate Report to the WPA identified only two statutes the violation of which would preclude whistleblower protection, the first being Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947,61Stat.498, which pro-vided that 鈥渢he Director of Central Intelligence shall be re-sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.鈥 See S. Rep. No. 95鈥969, pp. 21鈥22 (1978). This example clearly suggests Congress contemplated that a statute directing an agency to protect against disclosures and delegating substantial authority to the agency should nevertheless be deemed to impose the relevant prohibition. Section 114(r)(1)鈥檚 delegation to the TSA to 鈥渄ecide鈥 whether the release of particular information would be 鈥渄etrimental to the security of transportation鈥 likewise simply reflects Congress鈥 recognition of the inevitable fact that the agency will be tasked, in the first instance, with enforcing its statutory mandate.
In sum, with Section 114(r)(1), Congress has required agency action that would preclude the release of information 鈥渄etrimental to the security of transportation.鈥 In so doing, Congress has expressed its clear intent to pro-hibit such disclosures. I would respect its intent, and hold that a disclosure contravening that mandate is 鈥減rohibited by law鈥 within the meaning of the WPA.
Having said all that, I appreciate the narrowness of the Court鈥檚 holding. The Court鈥檚 conclusion that Section 114(r) does not itself prohibit any disclosures depends entirely on the statutory language directing the agency to 鈥減rescribe regulations,鈥 and providing that the agency will 鈥渄ecid[e]鈥 what information falls within the statue鈥檚 purview. See ante, at 11. From all that appears in the majority opinion, then, this case would likely have turned out differently if Section 114(r) instead provided: 鈥淭he disclosure of information detrimental to the security of transportation is prohibited, and the TSA shall promulgate regulations to that effect,鈥 or 鈥淭he Under Secretary shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information detrimental to the security of transportation; and such disclosures are prohibited.鈥 I myself decline to surrender so fully to sheer formalism, especially where transportation security is at issue and there is little dispute that the disclosure of air marshals鈥 locations is potentially dangerous and was proscribed by the relevant implementing regulation. In so surrendering, however, the Court would appear to have enabled future courts and Con-gresses to avoid easily the consequences of its ruling, and thus to have limited much of the potential for adverse practical effects beyond this case. But in the interim, at least, the Court has left important decisions regarding the disclosure of critical information completely to the whims of individual employees.
I respectfully dissent.
Notes
[1] The Court does not address respondent鈥檚 alternative argument, accepted by the Court of Appeals below, that Section 114(r)(1) describes the information encompassed in its prohibitory scope with insufficient particularity to qualify the disclosure here as 鈥specifically prohibited by law鈥 within the meaning of the WPA. Some of the legislative history of the WPA linked its specificity requirement to the criteria established in Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act,5 U. S. C. 搂552(b)(3), and the Court of Appeals applied this standard. See 714 F. 3d 1301, 1309 (CA Fed. 2013); see also S. Rep. No. 95鈥969, pp. 21鈥22 (1978). MacLean has offered no argument that a WPA anti-disclosure statute must define the relevant category of information with any greater degree of particularity. Assuming the Exemption 3 standard is applicable, I note that Section 114(r) is at least as 鈥渟pecific鈥 as the statutory provisions we have previously held to satisfy Exemption 3鈥檚 requirements. See, e.g., Department of Justice v. Julian,486 U. S. 1,9 (1988) (holding that provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(A) and former18 U. S. C. 搂4208(c)(1982 ed.) prohibiting disclosure of portions of presentence reports 鈥渞elat[ed] to confidential sources, diagnostic opinions, and other information that may cause harm to the defendant or to third parties鈥 could justify withholding under Exemption 3 (emphasis added)).
[2] For the same reasons, the agency鈥檚 decision that a disclosure contravened a statute may not necessarily be determinative in any given WPA case: Although an agency may no doubt receive deference in the interpretation and implementation of a prohibitory statute, ultimately WPA protection will not apply if the agency improperly concluded that a given disclosure was prohibited by that statute. Cf. CIA v. Sims,471 U. S. 159鈥181 (1985) (according deference to Central Intelligence Agency鈥檚 expertise, but engaging in an extended analysis of whether the particular information the agency refused to disclose fell within the scope of the statutory prohibition).