NOTICE:鈥俆his opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.鈥僐eaders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 12鈥315
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AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION,PETITIONER v. WILLIAM L. HOEPER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
[January 27, 2014]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 2001, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to assess and manage threats against air travel. Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),49 U. S. C. 搂44901 et seq. To ensure that theTSA would be informed of potential threats, Congress gave airlines and their employees immunity against civil liability for reporting suspicious behavior. 搂44941(a). But this immunity does not attach to 鈥渁ny disclosure made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading鈥 or 鈥渁ny disclosure made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.鈥 搂44941(b).
The question before us is whether ATSA immunity may be denied under 搂44941(b) without a determination that a disclosure was materially false. We hold that it may not. Because the state courts made no such determination, and because any falsehood in the disclosure here would not have affected a reasonable security officer鈥檚 assessment of the supposed threat, we reverse the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court.
I
A
William Hoeper joined Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation as a pilot in 1998. But by late 2004, Air Wisconsin had stopped operating flights from Denver, Hoeper鈥檚 home base, on any type of aircraft for which he was certified. To continue flying for Air Wisconsin out of Denver, Hoeper needed to gain certification on the British Aerospace 146 (BAe-146), an aircraft he had not flown.
Hoeper failed in his first three attempts to pass a proficiency test. After the third failure, as he later acknowledged at trial, his employment was 鈥渁t [Air Wisconsin鈥檚] discretion.鈥 App. 193. But he and Air Wisconsin entered into an agreement to afford him 鈥渙ne more opportunity to pass [the] proficiency check.鈥 Id., at 426. The agreement left little doubt that Hoeper would lose his job if he failed again.
In December 2004, Hoeper flew from Denver to Virginia for simulator training as part of this final test. During the training, Hoeper failed to cope with a challenging scenario created by the instructor, Mark Schuerman, and the simulator showed the engines 鈥渇lam[ing] out鈥 due to a loss of fuel. App. 203. As Schuerman began to tell Hoeper that he 鈥渟hould know better,鈥 ibid., Hoeper responded angrily. He later described what happened:
鈥淎t this point, that鈥檚 it. I take my headset off and I toss it up on the glare shield. . . . [Schuerman] and I exchanged words at the same elevated decibel level. Mine went something like this: This is a bunch of shit. I鈥檓 sorry. You are railroading the situation and it鈥檚 not realistic.鈥 Id., at 203鈥204.
When Hoeper announced that he wanted to call the legal department of the pilots鈥 union, Schuerman ended the session so that Hoeper could do so. Schuerman then re-ported Hoeper鈥檚 behavior to Patrick Doyle, the Wisconsin-based manager of the BAe-146 fleet. Doyle booked Hoeper on a United Airlines flight back to Denver.
Several hours after Schuerman鈥檚 report, Doyle discussed the situation at Air Wisconsin鈥檚 headquarters with the airline鈥檚 Vice President of Operations, Kevin LaWare; its Managing Director of Flight Operations, Scott Orozco; and its Assistant Chief Pilot, Robert Frisch. LaWare later ex-plained the accretion of his concerns about what Hoeper might do next. He regarded Hoeper鈥檚 behavior in the simulator as 鈥渁 fairly significant outburst,鈥 of a sort that he 鈥渉adn鈥檛 seen . . . before.鈥 Id., at 276. And he knew 鈥渋t was a given that . . . Hoeper鈥檚 employment was . . . going to be terminated鈥 as a result of his failure to complete the simulator training. Id., at 278.
Then, LaWare testified, Orozco mentioned that Hoeper was a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO). The FFDO program allows the Government to 鈥渄eputize volunteer pilots of air carriers . . . to defend the flight decks of aircraft . . . against acts of criminal violence or air piracy.鈥 搂44921(a). FFDOs are permitted 鈥渢o carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation.鈥 搂44921(f )(1). Hoeper had become an FFDO earlier in 2004 and had been issued a firearm. He was not allowed to carry the firearm during his trip to the training facility, because he was not 鈥渆ngaged in providing air transportation,鈥 ibid. But according to one official at the meeting, the Denver airport鈥檚 security procedures made it possible for crew members to bypass screening, so that Hoeper could have carried his gun despite the rule. Indeed, Frisch later testified that he was 鈥渁ware of one鈥 incident in which an Air Wisconsin pilot had come to training with his FFDO weapon. App. 292. On the basis of this information, LaWare concluded, there was 鈥渘o way . . . to confirm鈥 whether 鈥淗oeper had his weapon with him, even though . . . by policy, [he was] not supposed to have it with him.鈥 Id., at 279.
Finally, LaWare testified, he and the other Air Wisconsin officials discussed two prior episodes in which disgruntled airline employees had lashed out violently. Id., at 280. In one incident, a FedEx flight engineer under investigation for misconduct 鈥渆ntered the cockpit鈥 of a FedEx flight 鈥渁nd began attacking the crew with a hammer鈥 before being subdued. United States v. Calloway, 116 F. 3d 1129, 1131 (CA6 1997). In another, a recently fired ticket agent brought a gun onto a Pacific Southwest Airlines flight and shot his former supervisor and the crew, leading to a fatal crash. Malnic, Report Confirms That Gunman Caused 1987 Crash of PSA Jet, L. A. Times,Jan. 6, 1989, p. 29.
In light of all this鈥擧oeper鈥檚 anger, his impending termination, the chance that he might be armed, and the history of assaults by disgruntled airline employees鈥擫aWare decided that the airline 鈥渘eed[ed] to make a call to the TSA,鈥 to let the authorities know 鈥渢he status鈥 of the situation. App. 282.
Doyle offered to make the call. According to the jury, he made two statements to the TSA: first, that Hoeper 鈥渨as an FFDO who may be armed鈥 and that the airline was 鈥渃oncerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm鈥; and second, that an 鈥淸u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today.鈥 App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. (The latter statement appears in the record as the subject line of an internal TSA e-mail, summarizing the call from Doyle. App. 414.)
The TSA responded to the call by ordering that Hoeper鈥檚 plane return to the gate. Officers boarded the plane, re-moved Hoeper, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. When Hoeper stated that the gun was at his home in Denver, a Denver-based federal agent went there to retrieve it.
Later that day, Hoeper boarded a return flight to Denver. Air Wisconsin fired him the following day.
B
Hoeper sued Air Wisconsin in Colorado state court on several claims, including defamation.[1] Air Wisconsin moved for summary judgment on the basis of ATSA immunity,[2] but the trial court denied it, ruling that the jury was entitled to find the facts pertinent to immunity. The case went to trial, and the court denied Air Wisconsin鈥檚 motion for a directed verdict on the same basis. It submitted the question of ATSA immunity to the jury, with the instruction鈥攆ollowing the language of 搂44941(b)鈥攖hat immunity would not apply if Hoeper had proved thatAir Wisconsin 鈥渕ade the disclosure [to the TSA] with ac-tual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading鈥 or 鈥渨ith reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.鈥 App. 582. The jury instructions did not state that ATSA immunity protects materially true statements.
The jury found for Hoeper on the defamation claim and awarded him $849,625 in compensatory damages and $391,875 in punitive damages. The court reduced the latter award to $350,000, for a total judgment of just under $1.2 million, plus costs.
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. 232 P. 3d 230 (2009). It held 鈥渢hat the trial court properly submitted the ATSA immunity issue to the jury,鈥 that 鈥渢he record supports the jury鈥檚 rejection of immunity,鈥 and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury鈥檚 defamation verdict. Id., at 233.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 2012 WL 907764 (Mar. 19, 2012). It began by holding, contrary to the lower courts, 鈥渢hat immunity under the ATSA is a question of law to be determined by the trial court before trial.鈥 Id., at *4. But it concluded that the trial court鈥檚 error in submitting immunity to the jury was 鈥渉armless because Air Wisconsin is not entitled to immunity.鈥 Id., at *6. In a key footnote, the court stated: 鈥淚n our determination of immunity under the ATSA, we need not, and therefore do not, decide whether the statements were true or false. Rather, we conclude that Air Wisconsin made the statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.鈥 Id., at *16, n. 6. The court thus appears tohave labored under the assumption that even true statements do not qualify for ATSA immunity if they are made recklessly.
Applying this standard, and giving 鈥渘o weight to the jury鈥檚 finding[s],鈥 ibid., n. 5, the court held that 鈥淸a]l-though the events at the training may have warranteda report to TSA,鈥 Air Wisconsin鈥檚 statements 鈥渙verstated those events to such a degree that they were made with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.鈥 Id., at *7. The court opined that Air Wisconsin 鈥渨ould likely be immune under the ATSA if Doyle had reported that Hoeper was an Air Wisconsin employee, that he knew he would be terminated soon, that he had acted irrationally at the training three hours earlier and 鈥榖lew up鈥 at test administrators, and that he was an FFDO pilot.鈥 Id., at *8. But because Doyle actually told TSA 鈥(1) that he believed Hoeper to be mentally unstable; (2) that Hoeper had been terminated earlier that day; and (3) that Hoeper may have been armed,鈥 id., at *7, the court determined that his statements 鈥渨ent well beyond鈥 the facts and did not qualify for immunity, id., at *8. The court went on to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury鈥檚 defamation verdict.
Justice Eid, joined by two others, dissented in part. She agreed with the majority鈥檚 holding that immunity is an issue for the court, not the jury. But she reasoned that Air Wisconsin was entitled to immunity 鈥渂ecause [its] statements to the TSA were substantially true.鈥 Id., at *11.
We granted certiorari to decide 鈥淸w]hether ATSA immunity may be denied without a determination that the air carrier鈥檚 disclosure was materially false.鈥 570 U. S. ___ (2013).
II
A
Congress patterned the exception to ATSA immunity after the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,376 U. S. 254 (1964), and we have long held that actual malice requires material falsity. Because we presume that Congress meant to incorporate the settled meaning of actual malice when it incorporated the language of that standard, we hold that a statement otherwise eligible for ATSA immunity may not be deniedimmunity unless the statement is materially false.
In New York Times, we held that under the First Amendment, a public official cannot recover 鈥渇or a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 鈥榓ctual malice鈥欌攖hat is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.鈥 Id., at 279鈥280. Congress borrowed this exact language in denying ATSA immunity to 鈥(1) any disclosure made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading; or (2) any disclosure made with recklessdisregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.鈥 搂44941(b).
One could in principle construe the language of the actual malice standard to cover true statements made recklessly. But we have long held, to the contrary, that actual malice entails falsity. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767,775 (1986) (鈥淸A]s one might expect given the language of the Court in New York Times, a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation鈥 (citation omitted)); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64,74 (1964) (鈥淲e held in New York Times that a public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false鈥).
Indeed, we have required more than mere falsity to establish actual malice: The falsity must be 鈥渕aterial.鈥 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,501 U. S. 496,517 (1991). As we explained in Masson, 鈥淸m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as 鈥榯he substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.鈥 鈥 Ibid. A 鈥渟tatement is not considered false unless it 鈥榳ould have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.鈥 鈥 Ibid. (quoting R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 (1980)).
These holdings were settled when Congress enacted the ATSA, and we therefore presume that Congress meant to adopt the material falsity requirement when it incorporated the actual malice standard into the ATSA immunity exception. 鈥淸I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that, when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it is taken.鈥 FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). The actual malice standard does not cover materially true statements made recklessly, so we presume that Congress did not mean to deny ATSA immunity to such statements.
Other indicia of statutory meaning could rebut this presumption, but here, they do not. First, the ATSA鈥檚 text favors a falsity requirement. The first subsection of 搂44941(b) requires falsity, as a true disclosure cannot have been made 鈥渨ith actual knowledge鈥 that it 鈥渨as false.鈥 The only question is whether the second subsection鈥攚hich denies immunity to 鈥渁ny disclosure made with reckless disregard as to [its] truth or falsity鈥濃攕imilarly requires falsity. We conclude that it does. The second subsection simply extends the immunity exception from knowing falsehoods to reckless ones, ensuring that an air carrier cannot avoid liability for a baseless report by sticking its head in the sand to avoid 鈥渁ctual knowledge鈥 that its statements are false. 鈥淸T]he defense of truth . . . , even if not explicitly recognized, . . .is implicit in . . . a standard of recovery that rests on knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.鈥 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,420 U. S. 469鈥499 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
A material falsity requirement also serves the purpose of ATSA immunity. The ATSA shifted from airlines to the TSA the responsibility 鈥渇or assessing and investigating possible threats to airline security.鈥 2012 WL 907764, *14 (Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In directing the TSA to 鈥渞eceive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security,鈥49 U. S. C. 搂114(f)(1), Congress wanted to ensure that air carriers and their employees would not hesitate to provide the TSA with the information it needed. This is the purpose of the immunity provision, evident both from its context and from the title of the statutory section that contained it: 鈥渆ncouraging airline employees to report sus-picious activities.鈥 ATSA 搂125,115Stat.631 (capitali-zation and boldface type omitted). It would defeat this purpose to deny immunity for substantially true reports, on the theory that the person making the report had not yet gathered enough information to be certain of its truth. Such a rule would restore the pre-ATSA state of affairs, in which air carriers bore the responsibility to investigate and verify potential threats.
We therefore hold that ATSA immunity may not be denied under 搂44941(b) to materially true statements. This interpretation of the statute is clear enough that Hoeper effectively concedes it. See Brief for Respondent 30 (acknowledging that if the Colorado Supreme Court actually said 鈥 鈥榓n airline may be denied ATSA immunity . . . for reporting true information,鈥 鈥 then 鈥渢he court was likely wrong鈥). Hoeper does point out in a footnote that given Congress鈥 desire to deny immunity to 鈥 鈥榖ad actors,鈥 鈥 and 鈥済iven that the vast majority of reckless statements will not turn out to be true[,] . . . Congress could have quite reasonably chosen to deny the special privilege of ATSA immunity to all reckless speakers,鈥 even those whose statements turned out to be true. Id., at 30, n. 12. But although Congress could have made this choice, nothing about the statute鈥檚 text or purpose suggests that it actually did. Instead, Congress chose to model the exception to ATSA immunity after a standard we have long construed to require material falsity.
B
We are not persuaded by Hoeper鈥檚 arguments thatwe should affirm the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court notwithstanding its misapprehension of the ATSA immunity standard.
Hoeper first argues that Air Wisconsin forfeited the claim that it is entitled to immunity because its statements were materially true. His premise is that AirWisconsin argued the truth of its statements only in challenging the evidentiary basis for the defamation verdict, not in asserting immunity. But Air Wisconsin鈥檚 brief before the Colorado Supreme Court argued that the exception to ATSA immunity 鈥渁ppears to incorporate the New York Times actual malice standard,鈥 which鈥攁s we have explained鈥攔equires material falsity. Petitioner鈥檚 Opening Brief in No. 09SC1050, p. 24.
Hoeper next argues that the Colorado Supreme Court performed the requisite analysis of material falsity, albeit in the context of finding the record sufficient to support the jury鈥檚 defamation verdict. For several reasons, however, this analysis does not suffice for us to affirm the denialof ATSA immunity. First, to the extent that the immunity determination belongs to the court鈥攁s the Colorado Supreme Court held鈥攁 court鈥檚 deferential review of jury findings cannot substitute for its own analysis of the record. Second, the jury here did not find that any falsity in Air Wisconsin鈥檚 statements was material, because the trial court instructed it only to determine whether 鈥淸o]ne or more of th[e] statements was false,鈥 App. 580, without addressing materiality. Third, applying the material falsity standard to a defamation claim is quite different from applying it to ATSA immunity. In both contexts,a materially false statement is one that 鈥 鈥榳ould have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] from that which the . . . truth would have produced.鈥 鈥 Masson, 501 U. S., at 517. But the identity of the relevant reader or listener varies according to the context. In determining whether a falsehood is material to a defamation claim, we care whether it affects the subject鈥檚 reputation in the community. In the context of determining ATSA immu-nity, by contrast, we care whether a falsehood affects the authorities鈥 perception of and response to a given threat.[3]
III
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court鈥檚 analysis of material falsity was erroneous. We turn next to explaining why, by applying the ATSA immunity standard to the facts of this case.[4]
A
We begin by addressing how to determine the material-ity of a false statement in the ATSA context. As we noted earlier, a materially false statement is generally one that 鈥 鈥榳ould have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] from that which the . . . truth would have produced.鈥 鈥 Ibid. The parties quibble over whether ATSA immunity requires some special version of this standard, but they more or less agree鈥攁s do we鈥攖hat the usual standard suffices as long as the hypothetical reader or listener is a security officer.
A further question is what it means for a statement to produce 鈥 鈥榓 different effect on the mind of鈥 鈥 a security officer from that which the truth would have produced. In defamation law, the reputational harm caused by a false statement is its effect on a reader鈥檚 or listener鈥檚 mind. But contrary to the position of Hoeper鈥檚 counsel at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32鈥33, courts cannot decide whether a false statement produced 鈥 鈥榓 different effect on the mind of鈥 鈥 a hypothetical TSA officer without considering the effect of that statement on TSA鈥檚 behavior. After all, the whole reason the TSA considers threat reports is to deter-mine and execute a response.
A plaintiff seeking to defeat ATSA immunity need not show 鈥減recisely what a particular official or federal agency would have done in a counterfactual scenario.鈥 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27. Such a showing would be 鈥渋mpossible . . . given the need to maintain se-crecy regarding airline security operations.鈥 Brief for Re-spondent 42. But any falsehood cannot be material, for purposes of ATSA immunity, absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response to the supposed threat. Cf. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,426 U. S. 438,449 (1976) (an omission in a proxy solicitation 鈥渋s material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote鈥). This standard 鈥渋s an objectiveone, involving the [hypothetical] significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable鈥 security official, rather than the actual significance of that fact to a particular security official. Id., at 445.
B
We apply the material falsity standard to the facts of this case. In doing so, we neither embrace nor reject the Colorado Supreme Court鈥檚 unanimous holding 鈥渢hat immunity under the ATSA is a question of law to be determined by the trial court before trial.鈥 2012 WL 9097764, *4; see id., at *11 (Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with majority). Rather, we conclude that even if a jury were to find the historical facts in the manner most favorable to Hoeper, Air Wisconsin is entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter of law.
We begin with Air Wisconsin鈥檚 statement that Hoeper 鈥渨as an FFDO who may be armed.鈥 App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. Hoeper cannot dispute the literal truth of this statement: He was an FFDO, and because FFDOs possess weapons, any FFDO 鈥渕ay be armed.鈥 Hoeper argues only that to avoid any misinterpretation, Air Wisconsin should have qualified the statement by adding that it had no reason to think he was actually carrying his gun during the trip to Virginia, especially because he was not allowed to do so under 搂44921(f )(1).[5] We agree that Air Wisconsin鈥檚 statement could have been misinterpreted by some, but we reject Hoeper鈥檚 argument for two reasons. First, any confusion of the nature that Hoeper suggests would have been immaterial: A reasonable TSA officer, having been told only that Hoeper was an FFDO and that he was upset about losing his job, would have wanted to investigate whether Hoeper was carrying his gun. Second, to accept Hoeper鈥檚 demand for such precise wording would vitiate the purpose of ATSA immunity: to encourage air carriers and their employees, often in fast-moving situations and with little time to fine-tune their diction, to provide the TSA immediately with information about potential threats. Baggage handlers, flight attendants, gate agents, and other airline employees who report suspicious behavior to the TSA should not face financial ruin if, in the heat of a potential threat, they fail to choose their words with exacting care.[6]
We next consider Air Wisconsin鈥檚 statement that Hoeper 鈥渨as terminated today.鈥 App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. When Air Wisconsin made that statement, Hoeper had not yet been fired. But everyone knew the firing was almost certainly imminent. Hoeper acknowledged that his employment was 鈥渁t [Air Wisconsin鈥檚] discretion鈥 after his third failed test, App. 193, and the agreement between him and Air Wisconsin stated that his 鈥渇ourth . . . attempt鈥 to pass the test would be his 鈥渇inal鈥 one, id., at 426. No reasonable TSA officer would care whether an angry, po-tentially armed airline employee had just been fired or merely knew he was about to meet that fate.
Finally, we consider Air Wisconsin鈥檚 statements that Hoeper was 鈥淸u]nstable鈥 and that it was 鈥渃oncerned about his mental stability.鈥 App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. Al-though the details of Hoeper鈥檚 behavior during the simulator session may be disputed, Hoeper himself testified that he had become visibly angry: He decided 鈥渢hat鈥檚 it,鈥 he removed his headset and 鈥渢oss[ed] it,鈥 and he accused the instructor鈥攁t an 鈥渆levated decibel level,鈥 and with an expletive鈥攐f 鈥渞ailroading the situation.鈥 App. 203鈥204. It would surely have been correct, then, for Air Wisconsin to report that Hoeper 鈥 鈥榖lew up鈥 鈥 during the test. 2012 WL 907764, *8. The question is whether, from the perspective of a reasonable security officer, there is any material difference between a statement that Hoeper had just 鈥渂lown up鈥 in a professional setting and a statement that hewas 鈥淸u]nstable.鈥 We think not.
We are no more troubled by Air Wisconsin鈥檚 related statement that it was 鈥渃oncerned about [Hoeper鈥檚] mental stability.鈥 Hoeper is correct that many of the Air Wisconsin officials who attended the meeting at headquarters might not have framed their concerns in terms of 鈥渕en-tal stability.鈥 LaWare, for instance, testified that 鈥淸t]hose weren鈥檛 the words that [he] would have anticipated鈥 when he directed Doyle to call the TSA. App. 272. But the officials who attended the meeting did harbor concerns about Hoeper鈥檚 mental state: They knew he had just 鈥渂lown up,鈥 and they worried about what he might do next. It would be inconsistent with the ATSA鈥檚 text and purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because its employee could have chosen a slightly better phrase than 鈥渕ental stability鈥 to articulate its concern. Just as 鈥淸m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity鈥 in the defamation context, 鈥渟o long as 鈥榯he substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified,鈥 鈥 Masson, 501 U. S., at 517, a statement that would otherwise qualify for ATSA immunity cannot lose that immunity because of some minor imprecision, so long as 鈥渢he gist鈥 of the statement is accurate. Doyle鈥檚 statements to the TSA accu-rately conveyed 鈥渢he gist鈥 of the situation; it is irrelevant whether trained lawyers or judges might with the luxury of time have chosen more precise words.
Hoeper鈥檚 overarching factual theory appears to be that members of the BAe-146 team, including Doyle and Schuer-man, harbored personal animosity toward him, which caused them to manipulate the proficiency tests in order to fail him. But even if Hoeper were correct aboutall this (and we express no view on that question), we do not see why it would have made him any less a threat in the eyes of a reasonable security officer. As between two employees鈥攐ne who thinks he is being fired because of his inadequate skills, another who thinks he is being fired because his employer hates him鈥攖he latter is presumably more, not less, likely to lash out in anger.
The partial dissent argues that Doyle鈥檚 reference to Hoeper鈥檚 鈥渕ental stability鈥 was so egregious as to make his report to the TSA the basis of a $1.2 million defamation judgment. We disagree. While lawyers and judges may in some contexts apply the label 鈥渕entally unstable鈥 to people suffering from serious mental illnesses, see post, at 4 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that is hardly the only manner in which the label is used. A holding that Air Wisconsin lost its ATSA immunity by virtue of Doyle鈥檚 failure to be aware of every connotation of the phrase 鈥渕ental stability鈥 would eviscerate the immunity provision. All of us from time to time use words that, on reflection, we might modify. If such slips of the tongue could give rise to major financial liability, no airline would contact the TSA (or permit its employees to do so) without running by its lawyers the text of its proposed disclosure鈥攅xactly the kind of hesitation that Congress aimed to avoid.
The partial dissent further argues that Hoeper鈥檚 鈥渄isplay of anger鈥 made him no more a threat than 鈥渕illions of perfectly harmless air travelers.鈥 Post, at 4. But Hoeper did not just lose his temper; he lost it in circumstances that he knew would lead to his firing, which he regarded as the culmination of a vendetta against him. And he was not just any passenger; he was an FFDO, which meant that he could plausibly have been carrying a firearm. In short, Hoeper was not some traveling businessman who yelled at a barista in a fit of pique over a badly brewed cup of coffee.
Finally, the partial dissent relies on an expert鈥檚 testimony 鈥渢hat Hoeper鈥檚 behavior did not warrant any report to the TSA.鈥 Post, at 4 (citing App. 356). But the expert appears to have based that statement on an outdated understanding of reporting obligations that is flatly at odds with the ATSA. Prior to the ATSA, 鈥渁irlines were responsible for assessing and investigating possible threats to airline security.鈥 2012 WL 907764, *14 (Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But the ATSA shifted that responsibility to the TSA, creating a policy 鈥渒nown as 鈥榳hen in doubt, report.鈥 鈥 Ibid.; see supra, at 9. The expert who believed that Hoeper鈥檚 conduct did not warrant a report to the TSA also believed that airlines have 鈥渁n obligation . . . to filter out . . . the low noise from . . . what鈥檚 significant鈥 in reporting threats. App. 356. That understanding does not comport with the policy that Congress chose to enact.
The Colorado Supreme Court recognized that even if the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Hoeper, Air Wisconsin 鈥渨ould likely be immune鈥 had it 鈥渞eported that Hoeper . . . knew he would be terminated soon, that he had acted irrationally at the training three hours earlier and 鈥榖lew up鈥 at test administrators, and that he was an FFDO pilot.鈥 2012 WL 907764, *8. But the court erred in parsing so finely the distinctions between these hypothetical statements and the ones that Air Wisconsin actually made. The minor differences are, for the reasons we have explained, immaterial as a matter of law in determining Air Wisconsin鈥檚 ATSA immunity.
By incorporating the actual malice standard into 搂44941(b), Congress meant to give air carriers the 鈥 鈥榖reathing space鈥 鈥 to report potential threats to security officials without fear of civil liability for a few inaptly chosen words. New York Times, 376 U. S., at 272. To hold Air Wisconsin liable for minor misstatements or loose wording would undermine that purpose and disregard the statutory text.
*鈥冣赌*鈥冣赌*
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
[1] Air Wisconsin agrees that it bears responsibility for Doyle鈥檚 statements. 2012 WL 907764, *2, *16, n. 2 (Colo., Mar. 19, 2012).
[2] The ATSA immunity provision specifies that 鈥淸a]ny air carrier . . . or any employee of an air carrier . . . who makes a voluntary disclosureof any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation, relating to air piracy, a threat to aircraft or passenger safety, or terrorism, . . . to any employee or agent of the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice, any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer, or any airport or airline security officer shall not be civilly liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision of any State, for such disclosure.鈥.
[3] These are very different inquiries. Suppose the TSA receives the following tip: 鈥淢y adulterous husband is carrying a gun onto a flight.鈥 Whether the husband is adulterous will presumably have no effect on the TSA鈥檚 assessment of any security risk that he poses. So if the word 鈥渁dulterous鈥 is false, the caller may still be entitled to ATSA immunity. But any falsity as to that word obviously would affect the husband鈥檚 reputation in the community, so it would be material in the context of a defamation claim.
[4] We 鈥渞ecognize the prudence . . . of allowing the lower courts 鈥榯o undertake [a fact-intensive inquiry] in the first instance.鈥 鈥 v. ,. Here, however, we conclude that another prudential consideration鈥攖he need for clear guidance on a novel but important question of federal law鈥攚eighs in favor of our applying the ATSA immunity standard. Cf. v. , (鈥淸T ]his Court鈥檚 role in marking out the limits of [a ] standard through the process of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance鈥).
[5] See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42鈥43 (concession by Hoeper鈥檚 counsel that 鈥渋t would have been true for [Air Wisconsin] to say, look, we鈥檙e calling to let you know, because Mr. Hoeper鈥檚 an FFDO, we don鈥檛 have any reason to believe that he has gun with him, but we can鈥檛 tell for sure, so we just thought we would tell you, in case you have any questions and want to investigate further鈥).
[6] Hoeper also takes issue with Air Wisconsin鈥檚 statement that it was 鈥渃oncerned about . . . the whereabouts of his firearm,鈥 App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. But his arguments concerning this statement are the same as those concerning the statement that he 鈥渕ay [have] been armed,鈥 ,and we reject them for the same reasons.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12鈥315
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AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION,PETITIONER v. WILLIAM L. HOEPER
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the supreme court of colorado
[January 27, 2014]
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Kagan join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U. S. C. 搂44901 et seq., an airline may not be denied immunity for a re-port it made to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) absent a finding that the report was materially false. I also agree that, in this context, materiality means that the falsehood had a natural tendency to influence a reasonable TSA officer鈥檚 determination of an appropriate response to the report; and that neither the jury nor the courts below considered material falsity in this ATSA-specific way. I therefore join Parts I, II, and III鈥揂 of the Court鈥檚 opinion.
Having answered the question we granted certiorari to decide, see 570 U. S. ___ (2013), I would stop there and remand the case for further proceedings. Instead, the Court proceeds to 鈥渁pply the [ATSA] material falsity standard to the facts of this case鈥 in the first instance, ante, at 13, and concludes as a matter of law that Air Wisconsin鈥檚 report to the TSA about William Hoeper was not materially false. In so holding, the Court in my view reaches out to decide a factbound question better left to the lower courts, and then proceeds to give the wrong answer. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part III鈥揃 and the disposition.
We have held that under the First Amendment, a court鈥檚 role is to determine whether 鈥淸a] reasonable jury could find a material difference between鈥 the defendant鈥檚 statement and the truth. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U. S. 496, 522 (1991) . That makes sense, since materiality is the sort of 鈥 鈥榤ixed question of law and fact鈥 鈥 that 鈥渉as typically been resolved by juries.鈥 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 512 (1995) . The jury has a vital role to play in the materiality inquiry, which entails 鈥 鈥榙elicate assessments of the inferences a 鈥渞easonable decisionmaker鈥 would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him鈥 鈥 and is therefore 鈥 鈥榩eculiarly one for the trier of fact.鈥 鈥 Ibid. (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438, 450 (1976) ; brackets omitted). Such a question cannot be withdrawn from the jury unless 鈥渢he facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion鈥 on which 鈥渞easonable persons . . . could [not] differ.鈥 McDermott Int鈥檒, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 337, 356 (1991) . The same rule applies to a determination of immunity from suit: When a defendant raises qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court must 鈥渁dop[t] . . . the plaintiff鈥檚 versionof the facts鈥 unless 鈥渘o reasonable jury could believe it.鈥 Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372 鈥380 (2007).
Therefore, if we are to apply the ATSA materiality standard to the complex record in this case in the first instance, it is proper to view 鈥渢he historical facts in the manner most favorable to Hoeper,鈥 as the Court purports to do. Ante, at 13. We must of course begin by taking as given the findings that we know the jury already made, including that Air Wisconsin told the TSA that the airline was 鈥渃oncerned about [Hoeper鈥檚] mental stability鈥 and that he was an 鈥淸u]nstable pilot,鈥 App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a (special verdict form), and that those statements were false, 2012 WL 907764, *10 (Colo., Mar. 19, 2012). Next, we must ask whether a reasonable jury could find the remaining historical facts to be such that those statements were not only false, but materially false from the perspective of a reasonable TSA agent. If not, judgment for Air Wisconsin is proper; but if so, the ATSA materiality question should be tried to a (properly instructed) jury. (Unless, of course, a reasonable jury would be compelled to find facts that would render the statements materially false, in which case judgment for Hoeper would be proper; but that is assuredly not the case here.)
Applying that reasonable-jury standard, I do not see how we can possibly hold as a matter of law that AirWisconsin鈥檚 report was not materially false. The Court acknowledges Hoeper鈥檚 description of the confrontation that spawned the airline鈥檚 threat report: After failinga flight simulator test, Hoeper 鈥渄ecided 鈥榯hat鈥檚 it,鈥 heremoved his headset and 鈥榯oss[ed] it,鈥 and he accusedthe instructor鈥攁t an 鈥榚levated decibel level,鈥 and withan expletive鈥攐f 鈥榬ailroading the situation.鈥 鈥 Ante, at 15 (quoting App. 203鈥204). A jury could credit Hoeper鈥檚 account. It could also believe his 鈥渙verarching factual theory鈥 that his anger was reasonable because the instructor had 鈥渕anipulate[d]鈥 the test to cause him to fail out of 鈥減ersonal animosity,鈥 ante, at 16鈥攁 theory that was not without supporting evidence, see, e.g., App. 259鈥260 (pilot testifying as expert witness that Hoeper鈥檚 testing was 鈥渁bsolutely unfair鈥 and 鈥渂iased鈥). Moreover, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that no one who interacted with Hoeper during or after the confrontation鈥攊ncluding the instructor鈥攙iewed him as either unstable or threatening. See, e.g., id., at 15鈥16 (instructor acknowledging that he 鈥 鈥榪uickly realized it wasn鈥檛 a threatening situation鈥 鈥); id., at 29鈥31 (instructor testifying he 鈥 鈥榥ever felt that [Hoeper] was going to go do something stupid,鈥 鈥 鈥 鈥榙idn鈥檛 believe that Mr. Hoeper posed a threat in any way to anybody else at all,鈥 鈥 鈥 鈥榙id not believe that Mr. Hoeper was engaging in irrational behavior,鈥 鈥 and 鈥 鈥榙eem[ed] him perfectly safe to get on an airplane鈥 鈥); id., at 462 (airline representative who gave Hoeper permission to fly home testifying he 鈥渉ad no concern that [Hoeper] was a physical threat to anybody鈥 and 鈥渄idn鈥檛 believe he was mentally unstable鈥).
In short, a jury could find that Hoeper did nothing more than engage in a brief, run-of-the-mill, and arguably justified display of anger that included raising his voice and swearing, but that did not cause anyone, including the person on the receiving end of the outburst, to view him as either irrational or a potential source of violence. Viewing the facts in that light, I cannot agree with the Court thata reasonable TSA official would not 鈥渃onsider . . . important,鈥 ante, at 13, the difference between an individual who engaged in this sort of heated but commonplace display of anger, on the one hand, and on the other, anindividual whose colleagues regard him as 鈥渕entally unsta-ble.鈥 It is the difference between a category that no doubt includes millions of perfectly harmless air travelers and one that, in ordinary parlance, connotes an alarming degree of unpredictability and aggressiveness. Indeed, we have used that term in connection with individuals so 鈥渄angerously mentally ill鈥 that they may be subject to civil confinement. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 363 (1997) . The importance of that difference was highlighted by the expert testimony in this case of a former TSA Federal Security Director, who stated鈥攂ased on a version of the underlying facts the jury was entitled to accept鈥攖hat Hoeper鈥檚 behavior did not warrant any report to the TSA. App. 356.[1]*
The association with dangerous mental illness is not, as the Court suggests, merely one 鈥渃onnotation of the phrase 鈥榤ental [in]stability鈥 鈥 among many, ante, at 17; it is the everyday understanding of that phrase. The Court says that this is 鈥渉ardly the only manner in which the label is used,鈥 ibid., but it does not even attempt to describe another usage, let alone one that would be a materially accurate description of the facts of this case as a jury might find them. The Court also suggests that the circumstances of this case鈥攑articularly the fact that Hoeper knew his firing was imminent, had reason to be angry with the airline, and was authorized to carry a firearm鈥攄istinguish Hoeper鈥檚 confrontation with the instructor from an ordinary 鈥渇it of pique.鈥 Ibid. But if so, it was all the more important for the airline to make an accurate report to the TSA, so that the agency could assess the possible danger and determine an appropriate response. Falsely reporting to the TSA that a young Irishman is an IRA terrorist is much more likely to produce a promptand erroneous response than reporting that a 70-year-old English grandmother is. The circumstances the Court identifies enhanced, rather than diminished, the likelihood that the false 鈥渕entally unstable鈥 designation would have a material effect on the TSA鈥檚 response.
In sum, it is simply implausible that, taking the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Hoeper, a reason-able jury would have to find that the report of mental in-stability would have no effect upon the course of action determined by the TSA. The Court鈥檚 holding to the contrary demonstrates the wisdom of preserving the jury鈥檚 role in this inquiry, designed to inject a practical sense that judges sometimes lack. I respectfully dissent from that holding.
Notes
[1] * The Court dismisses the former Director鈥檚 testimony because he testified that in making threat reports to the TSA, airline officials should use 鈥渃ommon sense鈥 to 鈥渇ilter out the garbage and report [only] really suspicious incidents,鈥 App. 356, a view the Court deems 鈥渇latly at odds with the ATSA,鈥 at 17. The ATSA, however, simply requires airlines to report 鈥渢hreat[s] to civil aviation,鈥 . The statute surely places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of reporting, but it certainly does not preclude the exercise of reasonable judgment in deciding what rises to the level of a 鈥渢hreat鈥 and what constitutes, as the former Director put it, irrelevant 鈥済arbage.鈥 And even if one disagrees with the former Director that no report should have been made at all, the point is that a reasonable jury could have considered his testimony relevant to establishing that falsely expressing concerns about an individual鈥檚 鈥渕ental stability鈥 in the circumstances of this case would have a material effect on the TSA鈥檚 decisionmaking process.